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SUPPLEMENT TO POOL MEMORANDUM 
Justice Powell 
Ronald 
May 12, 1987 
No. 86-1552, Department of Navy v. Egan 
The Navy hired Egan as a laborer at a nuclear submarine 
facility. On his job application, Egan noted that he had been 
convicted for assault and car-rying a pistol. He also noted that 
he has an alcohol problem~ He improperly failed to note two oth-
' er co p_yj ctions for carrying a loaded firearm. When the Navy dis-
covered these other convictions, it revoked Egan's security 
clearance. Because there were no jobs available at the facility 
that did not require a security clearance, Egan was discharged. 
2 • 
Egan appealed (eventually) to the Merit Systems Protec-
tion Board (MSPB). MSPB consolidated this case with others to 
decide whether it has power to review the revocation of a securi-
ty clearance. MSPB decided that it could determine whether the 
Navy actually required a clearance for the job in question and 
whether the Navy actually had r~voked the clearance. But it de-
cided that it could not review the Navy's decision to revoke the 
clearance. 
v 
On appeal, CAFed reversed. 5 U.S.C. §7512 provides for 
MSPB review of all agency personnel actions. There is no excep-
tion _for security clearances. Accordingly, MSPB should have re-
viewed this decision. CAFed noted that Congress has recognized 
the strong government interest in national security. To that 
end, Congress enacted §7532, that~ lows suspension of a security 
clearance (without MSPB re~iew) when it is "necessary in the in-
terests of national security." The Navy did not act under §7532 
in this case. Accordingly, it is bound by t ~e normal §7512 pro-
cedures, including MSPB review. 
The ~ rgues persuasively that CAFed's analysis is 
troublesome. §7532 provides for removal only if the Navy deter-
/ I ~, 
mines, after a hearing, that removal is necessary in the inter-
ests of national security. This is a much stricter standard than 
the standard for granting a security clearance, if it is "clearly --- ~----~--------
consistent with the interests of national security." It is easy 
enough to see how giving Egan a clearance is not "clearly con-
sistent with the interests of national security." But CAFed's 
result indicates that Egan can keep his . clearance until the Navy 
; 
demonstrates that it is "necessary 
security" to revoke the clearance. 
3. 
in the interests of national 
Such a decision infringes the 
President's unbridled discretion to grant and revoke security 
clearances. 
Of course, Congress' creation of the MSPB demonstrates 
the important interests in unbi~sed review of actions that ad-
versely affect federal employees. Thus, CAFed's decision is not 
clearly wrong. On the other hand, the Court regularly has re-
fused to apply relatively clear statutory language in a way that 
might compromise the efficiency of the armed forces. I think the 
SG's _argument is persuasive enough to merit review by this Court. 
I note that there is no conflict in the CAs, but I gather that 
all such cases go to ~AFed; accordingly there can be no conflict. --- ~=-- --
I recommend GRANT. 
.. 
.Q../k..., ~~ •. ~ 
-- ~ ~ ~ .:Jl.-f ~ h.~ - ~ 
--·~~LL-(~~ 
~ ti~~\'-~~ 
/,v-vU.,~ ; /~ ~ J/1..u._ ~-4 
~~-~~~~ / 
s G--~ r~ 1-v.- <A..-l., ~ 
~ /1,{_~_.i-~-vz~.6-t ' 
PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
May 21, 1987 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 2 
No. 86-1552-CFX 
DEPT. OF NAVY (wants no 




THOMAS E. EGAN 
(employee who lost 
security clearance) 
Cert to CAFed (Newman, Swygert 
[CA7), Markey-;--f~-Y:- [dis.)) 
Federal / Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr argues that the CAFed erred in per-
mitting the Board to review decisions to deny security clearance. 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: · On Nov. 29, 1981, 
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resp was appointed to a position of laborer at a Naval submarine 
facility and then, on Apr. 18, 1982, assigned to that of labor 
leader, a position with access to secret or confidential informa-
tion. A condition for the retention of resp's employment was his 
satisfactory completion of security reports. Over a year after 
resp's initial appointment, the Director of Naval Civilian Per-
sonnel Command (NCPC) issued a notice of intention to deny/revoke 
resp's security clearance. The reason for this action was resp's 
prior convictions for assault and carrying a pistol (apparently 
listed on his job application), his failure to list in his appli-
cation two other convictions for carrying a loaded firearm, and 
his alcohol problem (also initially documented by resp). In a 
written reply to this notice, resp stated (1) that he had not 
listed the two convictions either because they had been dismissed 
or he had not been found guilty of them and because they were 
outside the period stated on the application, (2) that, with 
respect to the other two convictions, he had paid his "debt" to 
society for them, and (3) that alcohol had not been a problem for 
him for more than three years. 
~ 
The NCPC did not accept this 
explanation as adequate and revoked resp' s security clearance. 
Because security clearance was a mandatory condition for resp's 
job ( he worked on and around nuclear submarines) and because 
transfer to a nonsecurity position was not feasible at the facil-
ity, resp was removed from his position. 
Resp appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board 
(Board), which reversed the removal decision. The presiding 
official (PO) stated that the agency must set forth the criteria 
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according to which a security clearance is granted or denied and 
explain how these criteria are related to national security. 
Petr had set forth no such criteria or explanation, and so it was 
impossible to determine whether its decision was reasonable. 
Petr also failed to present evidence that it had weighed consci-
entiously the circumstances of resp's misconduct against the 
interests in national security and to heed the PO'S warning about 
the deficiencies in its evidence and the problem in relying upon 
conclusory statements. 
The Board itself in turn reversed the PO. (Because 
this a other cases presented a similar issue, the Board made 
"test" case and solicited amicus briefs on the issues.) 
Board stated that it had no authority to review petr's 
The 
stated 
reasons for the security clearance determination. Its review was 
limited to the following: "(1) the requirement of a security 
clearance for the position in question; (2) the loss or denial of 
the security clearance; (3) and the granting of minimal due proc-
ess protection to the employee." Ptn. App. 7a. This due process 
suggested that an employee should have notice of the denial or 
revocation, a statement of the reasons for it, and an opportunity 
to respond. Moreover, the Board could not order reinstatement of 
a security clearance; rather, the appropriate remedy, if an em-
ployee were denied due process, would be to reverse the action 
and to order the agency to put the employee back on a pay status. 
The agency could then reinstate the removal after supplying the 
employee with the due process. In resp's case, the correct pro-
cedures mandated by due process had been followed. 
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The CAFed vacated and remanded. It first observed that 
5 U.S.C. §7532 ("the head of an agency may suspend without pay an 
employee of his agency when he considers that action necessary in 
the interests of national security" [full text on Ptn. App. 73a-
74a]), which excludes Board review, is not the exclusive basis 
for removal on national security grounds and, in fact, was not 
petr's stated basis in this case. Rather, resp was removed pur-
suant to §§7512 and 7513 ("an agency may take an action covered 
by this subchapter against an employee only for such cause as 
will promote the efficiency of the service" [full text in Ptn. 
App. 72a-73a]), which provide for the standard Board review. 
There is nothing in §7532 stating that it preempts §7513 proce-
dures in national security cases; it is up to the agency to se-
lect the appropriate procedure for a particular case. 
The CAFed then considered the Board's proper scope of 
review in this case. The Board was wrong to think that it had no 
authority to review petr's reasons for the security clearance 
determination. §7701(c)(l)(B) provides that the Board will de-
termine whether an agency's decision is supported by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, and no exception is made for security 
clearance decisions (unless, of course, the removal is based on 
§7532). See Hoska v. United States Dept. of Army, 677 F.2d 131 
(CADC 1982). The Board relied upon Exec. Order No. 10,450 under 
which a "head of each department and agency of the government 
shall be responsible for establishing and maintaining within his 
department or agency an effective program to insure that the 
employment and retention in employment of any civilian officer or 
. ' - 5 -
employee within the department or agency is clearly consistent 
with the interests of national security" [full text, Ptn. App. 
75a-86a]. This Order, which establishes responsibilities in the 
Executive Branch, has nothing to do with appellate review of an 
agency's decisions as to security clearance. 
The Board acknowledges that, in general, it has the 
authority to review the merits of a case, including the underly-
ing reasons on which an adverse action was based. There is an 
exception for military assignments, see Zimmerman v. Dept. of 
Army, 755 F.2d 156 (CAFed 1985); Buriani v. Dept. of Air Force, 
777 F.2d 674 (CAFed 1985), criminal convictions, and bar decerti-
fications, but these cases are not relevant here: security clear-
ances involve employees in military and civilian agencies; the 
law on criminal convictions and bar decertifications prevents 
collateral attacks on other tribunals--here petr wants to insu-
late its decision from appellate review. While the Board thought 
that a review of a security clearance decision would bring to 
light all sorts of sensitive information, no such materials were 
asserted to be relevant in resp's case (and petr always has the 
option of proceeding under §7532 if it is worried about disclos-
ing such materials). Because resp' s removal was "for cause" 
under §7512 and according to specific criteria in petr's own 
regulations (i.e., deliberate false statement [see regulation, 
Ptn. App. 18a] ), the Board "is capable of reviewing the record to 
decide if the agency has established by appropriate standard that 
the employee should be denied security clearance." In addition, 
the Board also can evaluate the nexus between the criteria set 
... 
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out by petr's regulations and an employee's ability to safeguard 
classified information (such a determination is no different from 
other nexus exami nations made by the Boa rd) . Thus, the Boa rd 
here should make a full review of petr's action as it would any 
other agency action taken pursuant to §7512. 
The CAFed then noted that the Board's decision would 
produce the anomalous result of giving employees removed for 
national security reasons pursuant to §7512 less process than 
those removed pursuant to §7532, where a full evidentiary hearing 
is required, see §7532(c)(3)(C). Indeed, the Board's minimum due 
process is a departure from the statutorily mandated post-
termination hearing provided in S7701(a)(l) and the constitution-
al protection from a deprivation of a liberty or property inter-
est, see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). A right to a 
full hearing is particularly significant in a security clearance 
case. For the record of information used to deny security clear-
ance will make it difficult for resp to get other govt employment 
and even private sector employment. Although resp's alleged 
transgressions may justify his removal, the merits of petr's 
actions have not yet been reviewed by the Board. "The Board, by 
refusing to review an agency's reasons for refusal of security 
clearance, denies to those federal employees the minimal opportu-
nity to correct agency error, or to be protected from specious, 
arbitrary, or discriminatory actions." Ptn. App. 22a. 
Finally, the CAFed noted that the question of the reme-
dies available to petr if the Board orders resp's reinstatement 
is not ripe. On remand, the Board may well affirm petr's deci-
. ' - 7 -
s ion to removal resp. The problem partly has been created by 
petr which took over 15 mos. to investigate resp (whose criminal 
past, after all, was listed on his employment form). The Board 
will not substitute its judgment for that of petr or other agen-
cies on the security clearance matter, but will function only as 
a typical appellate tribunal, as it does in other cases. 
In a long (and somewhat rambling) dissent, C.J. Markey 
first observed that resp was nothing more than a conditional 
employee who did not satisfy the condition precedent to his job. 
(In a long footnote, he pointed out an anomaly that results from 
this case: because petr hired resp before conducting the full 
review, its security decision will be subject to Board review; if 
resp' s security clearance matter had been decided before resp 
started working, denial of employment on the basis of security 
clearance would never have been subject to Board review. Thus, 
agencies might be on notice no longer to hire probationary em-
ployees. He also points out that resp did not avail himself of 
an appeal process provided by petr.) 
Moreover, there is no evidence that officials of petr 
"arbitrarily" removed resp. Due process does not require a full 
evidentiary hearing to review the action against resp, especially 
where there is no dispute with respect to any material fact. If 
the majority's evaluation is allowed to stand, the discretion to 
grant or to deny a security clearance, given by Exec. Order No. 
10450 to an agency's head, will now be in the hands of the Board, 
which has no institutional competence to make such a decision. 
The question is not what is within the Board's jurisdiction, but 
.. 
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what is the scope of that jurisdiction. "Congress has not sig-
nalled any intent that MSPB should use the jurisdiction it was 
granted as authority to inject itself into that sensitive area 
committed to the Executive branch." Ptn. App. 34a. This case is 
like Zimmerman and Buriani where employees were denied continued 
civilian employment because of unreviewable military decisions. 
In addition, there is a separation of powers problem 
here. Who receives a security clearance is a matter assigned to 
the Executive Branch. "The majority does not tell us why an MSPB 
presiding official, or MSPB itself, is better, or even equally, 
qualified to make that judgment than are the responsible military 
officials." Ptn. App. 39a. Finally, C.J. Markey stated that 
the decision below would produce an absurd result: despite resp's 
criminal record and history of alcohol dependence, petr may be 
forced to grant him security clearance. The Board has not estab-
lished any set criteria for petr to apply in determining whether 
to grant or to deny a clearance. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The SG first argues that the power to 
determine whether an individual is 
~ 
sufficiently trustworthy to 
occupy an executive branch position is in the President's hands. 
Granting a security clearance requires an affirmative act of 
executive discretion. It is possible to specify some factors 
relied upon in making such a decision, but not to list all of 
them. This decision, which attempts to predict an employee's 
future behavior, is subjective in nature and "it is not reason-
ably possible for an outside, inexpert body to review the sub-
stance of such a judgment. 11 Brief 11. This Court has recognized 
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that, as to employees in sensitive positions, such decisions as 
to security clearance should be in the hands of an agency head. 
Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956). When the Civil Service Re-
form Act of 1978 was enacted, there never had been a case in 
which a denial of security clearance was reviewed on the merits. 
(The SG admits in a footnote that there were cases dealing with 
review on the merits of the security clearance revocation of govt 
contractors. See,~, Gayer v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 740 (CADC 
1973).) 
The CAFed is wrong in its conclusion that §§7512 and 
7513 permit a review of a denial of security clearance simply 
because this denial leads to a removal. See Zimmerman and Bur-
iani. The legislative history of the Act does not indicate that 
Congress intended to alter the settled law that denials of secu-
rity clearance are not subject to substantive review. To find 
congressional intent from congressional silence is misplaced 
especially with respect to decisions that are inherently discre-
sorts of intelligence mat-
evidence standard under 
tionary in nature and involving all 
ters. The preponderance of the 
§7701(c)(l)(B) is ill-suited to judge such determinations, for 
they are affirmative decisions where every doubt is resolved 
against the employee. Although the CAFed argues to the contrary, 
the Board will be second-guessing agency determinations in the 
full evidentiary hearing provided by §7701 (this already has 
happened in some cases). 
Moreover, the CAFed also errs in relying upon the 
availability of §7532, which is a drastic remedy not appropriate 
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for every denial of security clearance. §7532 requires an af-
firmative determination by the head of an agency that the removal 
is in the interests of national security. The granting of a 
security clearance, by contrast, occurs only if it is "clearly 
consistent with the interests of national security." If the 
agency cannot make such a finding, the employee has several im-
portant protections (notice, opportunity to be heard), but not 
the right to a review of the underlying security determination. 
Finally, the SG argues that review is appropriate for 
three reasons: (1) this is the dispositive case on the issue and 
was a test case; ( 2) national security interests are involved 
( there is a risk sensitive material will be brought to light); 
and (3) this case involves numerous decisions by agencies (200 by 
petr this year). 
In a five-page brief, resp simply notes that, if petr 
is worried about national security, then it can remove employees 
under §7532 and that resp was not a probationary employee (and 
thus entitled to the full protections of Board review). 
In a longer brief, amicus Bogdanowicz (an individual in 
resp's position and represented by American Federation of Govt 
Employees) points out that the SG ignores the Hoska decision, 
where the CADC noted that the Board could review an underlying 
basis for a security clearance revocation in an adverse personnel 
action. Moreover, the SG ignores the fact that in petr's own 
review process an employee, like resp, has no opportunity for a 
hearing to challenge the grounds for a security clearance revoca-
tion. The SG makes much of the "subjective" nature of the secu-
~ 
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rity clearance decision and of the Board's lack of suitability to 
review it. The Board, however, simply is being asked to review 
factual matters (~, did resp actually commit the crimes'?). 
The SG also is misleading when he states that there is no history 
of judicial review of security clearance denials. See Gayer v. 
Schlesinger, supra (govt contractor employees). Moreover, petr's 
property interest in his job and liberty interest are at stake. 
The hearing simply gives resp a chance to clear his name. 
The SG is wrong to suggest that there is no statutory 
authority for the Board's review in such cases: there is specific 
provision of §7513(a) that does not exclude this class of cases. 
And the SG downplays the availability of §7532 to the Govt. 
Moreover, the SG's position that §§7512 and 7513 provide for a 
review of removal but not for the agency action leading to remov-
al is illogical, for one can examine the removal only by looking 
at the facts allegedly supporting the denial of a security clear-
ance. The SG never raised the question of the standard of proof 
of §7701(c)(l)(B) below. 
4. DISCUSSION: This is a "test" case that potentially 
affects a large number of other cases and that presents the rath-
er sensitive issue of national security clearance. In my view, 
however, the CAFed has responded adequately to the arguments 
raised by the SG: the statutory language of §§7512 and 7513 makes 
no exception for removals based on security clearance revocation; 
the Exe cu ti ve Order does not deal with appe 11 ate review; the 
review here primarily would consist of an examination of factual 
matters; by the Board's decision resp is placed in the odd posi-
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tion of not being entitled to a hearing (although he would have 
one under §7532); and the issue of what petr must do is not ripe-
-the Board may conclude on remand that resp was properly dis-
missed. And there is the precedent of Hoska, whose approach is 
consistent with the CAFed's. 
There are some disturbing points in the CAFed's conclu-
sion, however. ~s C.J. Markey points out, agencies may be dis-
couraged from taking on employees before a security clearance has 
been run ( on the other hand, perhaps pet r is to blame in not 
speeding up the security check while employees are still on pro-
bationary status). Although this case does not present such a 
situation, there at least is the possibility that Board review 
will force agencies to disclose sensitive material (in such situ-
ations, however, the agency has the recourse of §7532). And the 
reasoning of cases like Zimmerman, where the condition of a ci-
vilian's job with the Army was continued membership in an Army 
Reserve Unit (which she lost), could be extended here. Just as 
the Board had no jurisdiction to examine military assignments or 
transfers, 755 F.2d, at 156, which were job conditions, concerns 
about potential interference with executive decision-making (par-
ticularly on military intelligence matters) would counsel against 
Board review of security clearance matters. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend a denial. 
There is a response and an amicus brief. 
May 12, 1987 Fanto opn in petn 
